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S.B. 297: PROCEDURAL CHANGES IN CIVIL
COMMITMENT FOR THOSE FOUND TO BE NOT
GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY IN OHIO
I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1980, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 297.1
The bill was promulgated to provide specific changes in the procedures
for the civil commitment and release hearings of persons found not
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI).2 This legislation was enacted as an

emergency measure 3 in response to increasing public unrest over the
release of NGRI patients.' Much of the concern was seemingly
precipitated by recent, well publicized trials in which the defendants
pled not guilty by reason of insanity following charges of murder. 5 The
1. Am. Sub. S.B. 297, 113th General Assembly (1980) (codified in scattered sections of titles 29 and 50 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1980 & Page 1981) (effective April 30, 1981)). See note 28 infra.
2. See Press Release from the Office of State Senator M. Morris Jackson, (21st
District, President Pro Tempore, Ohio Senate) (March 12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Jackson Press Release] (copy on file with the University of Dayton Law Review
office).
3. Section 7 of S.B. 297 reads:
This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. The reason for such
necessity lies in the fact that the act's safeguards are necessary to assure that
potentially dangerous persons who were found not guilty by reason of insanity or
incompetent to stand trial and committed to mental health facilities are not released
without judicial scrutiny. Additionally, the reason for such necessity is that certain
persons committed as mentally ill or mentally retarded under the former Ascherman Act were, at the time of their commitment, entitled to a probation hearing
upon recovery, and Am. Sub. H.B. 565 of the 112th General Assembly repealed
this right to a hearing, thereby removing from persons presently committed a
substantial right to which they were entitled at the time of their commitment.
Therefore, this act shall go into immediate effect.
4. "The legislative intent of this law ... was to protect the public from a sense
of vulnerability due to increasing public unrest about insane persons in the street."
Letter from Dr. Phillip Resnick to Ned J. Nakles, Jr. [hereinafter cited as Resnick Letter] (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review office). Dr. Resnick is Director
of the Psychiatric Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio, and is an Assistant Professor of
Psychiatry at Case Western Reserve School of Medicine. Dr. Resnick was frequently
consulted during the drafting of S.B. 297.
5. "The recent Levine and Geiger cases have focused attention on our controversial and complex criminal insanity law. These cases have outraged and frightened the
citizens of our community, yet they have served a purpose by pointing out the deficiencies in our law." Address by Senator M. Morris Jackson, Jewish Community Center's
Public Affairs Committee Program on "Insanity and the Law." (May 7, 1980)
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new bill was designed to correct procedural flaws in the present insanity law and insure public safety by holding the court in which the defendant was found NGRI responsible for commitment and release hearings. 6 This procedure attempts to insure greater public safety by giving
the court which is most familiar with the case and is most accountable
to the people of the county where the criminal act was committed, the
authority to make the decision regarding the NGRI patient's release.'
Among the most important changes the bill makes are: 1) the
change of jurisdiction of commitment and release hearings for persons
found NGRI from the probate court to the trial court in which the person was found NGRI; 8 2) allowing the original prosecutor, at any commitment or release hearing, the opportunity to argue that the person is
still mentally ill or mentally retarded and in need of hospitalization or
institutionalization;9 3) prohibiting a person found NGRI from being
able to voluntarily admit, and subsequently discharge, himself from
hospitalization; ' ° and 4) giving the trial court the power to monitor the
progress of the NGRI patient and retain control over him by allowing
conditional release programs."
The Ohio legislature has responded to the deficiencies in prior law
by enacting S.B. 297. In the words of Senator M. Morris Jackson,
prime sponsor of the legislation, "[]t will close glaring loopholes in
the present insanity law. It will insure public safety and guarantee an
NGRI patient due process and appropriate aftercare treatment. It is a
legislative step long overdue." 2
The following discussion will examine in detail the procedural
model which the law establishes for the civil commitment process, the
aforementioned changes which S.B. 297 effectuates, and the possible
constitutional questions arising from this legislation. The analysis will
begin with a brief look at the insanity defense.
[hereinafter cited as Address by Senator Jackson] (copy on file with the University of
Dayton Law Review office).

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980). Under prior Ohio law,
the probate court was' responsible for commitment and release hearings. These hearings were usually held in the Probate Court of Allen County, where the Lima State
Hospital for the criminally insane is located. Jackson Press Release, supra note 2.
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980). The prior law made no
provisions for the original prosecutor or the trial judge who heard the case to make
any presentation at the NGRI patient's commitment or release hearings.
10. Id. Former §§ 5122.15(G) and 1523.76(G) of the Ohio Revised Code allowed
any person involuntarily committed, to change his status and voluntarily admit, and
then discharge, himself during the initial 90 days of commitment.
11. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980). The prior law made no
provisions for conditional release.
12. Address by Senator Jackson, supra note 5.
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II.

THE INSANITY DEFENSE

A successful defense of a criminal charge results in acquittal and
release of the accused. 3 The successful defense of not guilty by reason
of insanity, however, will probably result in commitment of the defendant to a mental institution until his sanity has been regained. "'The effect of the NGRI defense is to relieve the defendant of responsibility
for committing the alleged criminal acts, thereby negating the state's
power to punish the individual." Because of his lack of blameworthiness the accused who is found NGRI is better suited to medicalcustodial treatment than to punitive-correctional measures. 16
Under the Ohio statutory scheme, when a defendant enters a plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity, he and the court become subject to
the provisions of section 2945.39 of the Ohio Revised Code. This section provides for an evaluation of the defendant's mental condition at
the time the alleged criminal offense was committed. The judge may
order up to three evaluations conducted either by a forensic center, or
by another facility designated by the Department of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation to conduct such evaluations, or by examiners
designated by the court." If the defendant has not been released on
bail or recognizance, he must be examined at his place of detention or
an another facility within thirty days.' 8 The examiner is to be informed
of the offense charged and at trial may be called as a witness by the
court and examined and cross-examined by counsel. "9A written report
concerning the mental condition of the defendant must be prepared by
the examiner and provided to the court, prosecutor, and defense
counsel.

20

In Ohio, for the jury to return a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity:
[tihe accused must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
disease or other defect of his mind had so impaired his reason that, at the
13. See W. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW at 324 (1978).
14. Id.
15. See State v. Summons, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 416, 422 (1852), aff'd, 5 Ohio St.
325 (1856).
[Iln order to [commit] a crime, a man must have intelligence and capacity
enough to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if his reason and mental
powers are so deficient that he has no will, no conscience or controlling mental
power, or if, through the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual

power is for the time obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and will not
be punished for criminal acts.
16.
17.

See W. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW at 324 (1978).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.39(A) (Page Supp. 1980).

18.

Id. § 2945.39(C).

19. Id.
20. Id.
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time of the criminal act with which he is charged, either he did not know
that such act was wrong or he did not have the ability to refrain from
doing that act.2"

This rule, adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Staten,22
is based upon the M'Naghten test for determining whether a defendant
is NGRI.2 3
III.

SENATE BILL 297-THE PROCEDURAL MODEL

Civil commitment of mentally ill persons is of course not restricted
to persons found NGRI. In general, civil committees are those persons
who are determined to be mentally ill subject to hospitalization by
court order and who, because of their illness, represent a substantial
risk of physical harm either to themselves or to others." Chapter 5122
of the Ohio Revised Code establishes the procedures by which all
classes of mentally ill persons are committed to appropriate institutions. "
One particular class of civil committees affected by chapter 5122
provisions is comprised of persons found NGRI. These people form a
group unique from other mentally ill committees in that a determination of their mental illness is made in a criminal proceeding." This
process, through which a defendant is determined to be not guilty of
commiting a criminal act because of his mental illness at the time of its
21. State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 21, 247 N.E.2d 293, 299 (1969), modified,
408 U.S. 938 (1972).
22.

Id.

23. The M'Naghten test requires that:
[at] the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
24. See text accompanying note 61 supra. The primary focus of this note is upon
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity. For an exhaustive examination of the
overall scope of civil commitment, see Comment, Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974). For treatment of this
subject in Ohio, see Blackley, Judicial Intervention as a Psychiatric Therapy Tool, 15
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 506 (1966); Dewey, Civil Incompetency in Ohio: Determination
and Effect, 34 CIN. L. REV. 419 (1965); Gui, Lavin, & Bradin, The New Ohio Mental
Health Act, 11 AKRON L. REV. 104.(1977). For additional reference, see generally
Saphire, The Civilly-Committed Public Mental Patient and the Right to Aftercare, 4
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 232 (1976); Comment, Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Ill,
38 MONTANA L. REV. 308 (1977); Comment, Commitment and Release Standards
and Procedures: Uniform Treatment for the Mentally Ill, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 825
(1974).
25. Chapter 5122 of the Revised Code is entitled "Hospitalization of Mentally
Ill.,,
26. See note 136 infra.
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commission, is governed by the provisions of section 2945.39 of the
Revised Code and by state common law. 2 After this determination has
been made, the person found NGRI is subject to procedures ensuring
appropriate disposition of the party. These procedures are contained in
section 2945.40 and chapter 5122 of the Revised Code.
Senate Bill 297 amends sections of titles 29 and 51 of the Ohio
Revised Code. "s The key section of the bill is section 2945.40,29 which

outlines the procedural effects of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity as they relate to civil commitment and conditional release, the
latter provision being a totally new addition to the existing law. Significant amendments are also made in section 5122.0230 and 5122.15. 31
Section 5122.02 now prohibits a person found not guilty by reason of
insanity from voluntarily admitting himself to a state hospital, while
section 5122.15 extends the amount of time between full hearings for
outright or conditional release of persons involuntarily committed.32
The complexity of the bill, resulting from the interrelation of the
amended provisions within the two titles, creates the necessity to formulate a working model of the procedures encompassed within the law
itself.
A.

JurisdictionalChanges in the Commitment Procedure

Formerly under Ohio law, upon a finding of not guilty by reason
of insanity, the trial court which rendered ,the verdict was required to
file an affidavit with the probate division of the court of common
pleas of either the county where the respondent lived, was institutionalized, or where he had been found NGRI.3 3 The affidavit had to
state the person to be "a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization
by court order. .

.

. " " A probable cause hearing was then conducted

by the probate court within three days in order to determine whether
the person was mentally ill, or retarded, subject either to hospitalization or institutionalization. 5 Upon such a finding, civil commitment in
27. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
28. Amended sections of Title 29 include: 2945.37, .371, .38, .39, .40. Amended
sections of Title 51 include: 5119.74, 5120.11, .16, 5122.01, .02, .05, .06, .10, .11, .12,
.141, .15, .20, .21, .22, 5123.68, .69, .71, .72, .73, .76, .78, .79, .80, 5125.05, .11. Section 5125.03 is repealed by this legislation.
29. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. (Page Supp. 1980). Section 2945.40 is entitled: "Procedure upon acquittal by reason of insanity."
30. Id. (Page 1981). Section 5122.02 is entitled: "Admission of voluntary
patients."
31. Id. Section 5122.15 is entitled: "Full hearing; disposition; mandatory hearing
on continued commitment."
32. Id. §§ 5122.02(D), .15(H).
33. Id. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1979).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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one of six types of facilities could have been ordered for an initial ninety day period. 3" This hearing was to be conducted in a physical setting
not likely to have a harmful effect on the respondent .

. . .

" The pro-

vision included the possibility of holding the hearing in a hospital outside the county where the person had been found not guilty by reason
of insanity. 3"
Senate Bill 297 changes the procedures within section 2945.40 by
relieving the probate court of jurisdiction over all full civil commitment hearings of persons found NGRI. Jurisdiction over the commitment decision now remains within the authority of the trial court
which originally finds the person not guilty by reason of insanity.39
Prior to the full hearing, "if the trial court judge believes that there is
probable cause that the person found not guilty by reason of insanity is
a mentally ill or retarded person, he may issue a temporary order of
detention .... ,4'The standard for determining the respondent to be a
mentally ill person remains that which is provided within section
5122.01(A).4 -36. Section 5122.15(C)(1)-(6) formerly read:
If, upon completion of the hearing, the court finds clear and convincing evidence
that the respondent is a mentally ill
person subject to hospitalization by court
order, the court may order the respondent's discharge or may order the respondent, for a period not to exceed ninety days to:
(1) A hospital operated by the department of mental health and mental retardation;
(2) A nonpublic hospital;
(3) The veterans' administration or other agency of the United States government;
(4) A community mental health clinical facility;
(5) Receive private psychiatric or psychological care and treatment. [sic]
(6) Any other suitable facility or person consistent with the diagnosis,
prognosis, and treatment needs of the respondent.
37. Id. § 5122.141.
38. Id. For a summary of the former statutory provisions in this area, see Sen.
Jud. Report of Sen. Bill 297 1-6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Report of S.B. 297] (copy
on fie with the Ohio Legislative Service Commission Library, Columbus, Ohio).
39. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(A) (Page Supp. 1980). Section 2945.40(A)
only names the court involved as the "trial court." Sections 5122.01(Q), and
5123.68M), however, have been amended to read: " 'Court' means the probate division of the court of common pleas except when the respondent is a person found not
guilty by reason of insanity, in which case 'court' means the court that found the
respondent not guilty by reason of insanity."
40. § 2945.40(A) (Page Supp. 1980). This section allows the trial court judge to
evaluate each situation before him when determining what type of facility the NGRI
patient should be detained in prior to, and during, the commitment hearing. It is suggested, therefore, that the person could possibly be held in a jail during this period. See
Report of S.B. 297 supra note 38.
41. Section 5122.01 defines mental illness to mean "a substantial disorder or
thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment,
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Upon a trial court determination of probable cause, a full hearing
must be held within seven court days"' after the initial verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity.' Failure to conduct the hearing within the
allotted time will result in immediate discharge of the respondent
unless, upon a showing of good cause, the trial judge grants a continuance.

44

The jurisdictional change in the law only applies to persons found
not guilty by reason of insanity. In all other cases, jurisdiction for the
full civil commitment hearing is vested in the probate court of the
county where the respondent is held, or in a probate court "out of the
county in which the respondent is held."'

5

Such hearings shall be

presided over by the probate court judge or by a referee assigned by
the judge.'
B.

The Full Hearing

All full hearings determining both initial and continued commitment decisions are held pursuant to section 5122.15 of the Ohio Revised Code.' The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure are controlling insofar
as they are not inconsistent with that section."' Senate Bill 297 provides
that all full hearings involving a respondent found not guilty by reason
of insanity are now to be open to the public.' 9
1. Parties to the Full Hearing; the Addition of the Prosecutor
Senate Bill 297 changes the procedure for full hearings by providing that the prosecutor who represented the state during the original
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the demands of life." In
making the probable cause determination, the trial court judge need not find a showing of dangerousness. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.40(A) (Page Supp. 1980),
5122.01(A) (Page 1981).
Findings of mental illness, being made for the purpose of civil commitment, involve
a completely different standard for determination than do the original finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity. The former finding depends upon the present mental state
of the person involved, while the latter is a determination of mental state at the time
the criminal act took place. See State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 21, 247 N.E.2d 293,
299 (1969). See generally notes 13-23 and accompanying text supra.
42. Amended § 2945.40(A) changed the time span for possible temporary detention from three to seven days. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(A) (Page Supp. 1980).
43. Id.

44.

Id.

45. Id. § 5122.15(A) (Page 1981).
46. Id. Section 5122.15(A) requires that any designated referee must be an attorney.
47. Id. § 5122.15.
48. Id. § 5122.15(A)(15).
49. Id. § 5122.15(A)(5). Civil committment hearings in cases not involving persons found not guilty by reason of insanity are still closed to the public. Id.
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criminal trial, continue to do so in the commitment proceedings."
Prior to passage of S.B. 297 prosecutors could not take part in either
commitment or release hearings involving persons found not guilty by
reason of insanity." The new law creates an adversary posture between
the state and the respondent, yet the proceedings remain within a civil
context. The prosecutor as the representative of the state, "shall present the case demonstrating that the respondent is a mentally ill person
subject to hospitalization by court order .. "'52This must be done in
all hearings where determinations as to commitment, release,
discharge, trial visits, and transfers are at issue. 53 In hearings to determine violation of conditional release, the prosecutor must present the
case showing such release to have been violated. 5"
In all full hearings under this law, the respondent is entitled to be
present and to be represented by the counsel of his choice. 55 If the respondent does not have counsel, and if this right has not been waived,
the court must appoint an attorney for him .6 In doing so, the court retains the right to have the respondent pay the counsel fee so long as he
is not shown to be an indigent. 7
The third party to all full hearings is the hospital or facility under
whose care and supervision the respondent has been placed. Senate Bill
297 provides for the Attorney General's office to designate an attorney
to represent the interests of such parties." In order to best represent
these interests, the assigned attorney "shall offer evidence of the
50. Senate Bill 297 now includes the prosecutor within the civil commitment pro:ess through the addition, in § 5122.01, of a completely new definition for that posi:ion. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(U) (Page 1981). The amended section now

-eads:
'Prosecutor' means the prosecuting attorney, village solicitor, city director of law,

or similar chief legal officer who prosecuted a criminal case in which a person was
found not guilty by reason of insanity, who would have had the authority to pro-

secute a criminal case against a person, if the person had not been found incompetent to stand trial, or who prosecuted a case in which a person was found guilty.
51. Prior to S.B. 297, prosecutors had lacked standing to take part in the civil
commitment and release hearings in any manner. Interview with John E. Murphy, Executive Director, Ohio Prosecuting Attorney's Association (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Murphy Interview] (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review office).
52. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(A)(10) (Page 1981).
53. Id. § 2945.40(G)(Page Supp. 1980).
54. Id. § 2945.40(D)(3). See notes 89-94 and accompanying text infra.
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(A)(2) (Page 1981). Sections 5122.15(A)(3),
(4) provide for appointment of counsel for the respondent. The procedural right to be
represented by a counsel of the respondent's choice, however, is an amended addition
which S.B. 297 adds to § 5122.15(A)(2). Previously that section only secured the
respondent's right to attend the hearing. Id. § 5122.15(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1979).
56. Id. §§ 5122.15(A)(3), (4) (Page 1981).

57.
qR

Id.

Id. § 5122.15(A)(1nN
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diagnosis, prognosis, record of treatment, and less restrictive plans, if
any. "19
2.

Necessary Showing for Commitment at Full Hearings

To order an initial commitment, or to have a commitment continued, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent is a "mentally ill or mentally retarded person subject to
"60 In order
hospitalization or institutionalization by court order ..
for either of these judgments to be rendered, there must be a showing
of at least one of the four requirements set forth in the definition of
''mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order" as
stated in Revised Code section 5122.01(B)(1)-(4), or a showing of both
requirements set forth in the definition of a "mentally retarded person
subject to institutionalization by court order" as is stated in Revised
Code section 5123.68(N)(1)-(2). The former is defined in section
5122.01(B) as:
[A] mentally ill person who, because of his illness: (1) [rlepresents a
substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by evidence of
threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious self-inflicted bodily harm;
(2) [rjepresents a substantial risk of physical harm to others as
manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior,
evidence of recent threats that place another in reasonable fear of violent
behavior and serious physical harm, or other evidence of present dangerousness; (3) [rlepresents a substantial and immediate risk of serious
physical impairment or injury to himself as manifested by evidence that
he is unable to provide for and is not providing for his basic physical
needs because of his mental illness and that appropriate provision for
such needs cannot be made immediately available in the community; or
(4) [wlould benefit from treatment in a hospital for his mental illness and
is in need of such treatment as manifested by evidence of behavior that
creates a grave and imminent risk to substantial rights of others or
himself."'
A mentally retarded person subject to institutionalization by court
order is defined in section 5123.68(N) as:
(1) [a] person who is at least moderately mentally retarded and, because
of his retardation, represents a very substantial risk of physical impairId.
60. Id. § 2945.40(C) (Page Supp. 1980).
61. "Mental Illness" as used in this subsection is defined in section 5122.01(A) of
the Revised Code as "a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orienta59.

tion, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality,
or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life."
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ment or injury to himself as manifested by evidence that he is unable to
provide for and is not providing for his most basic physical needs and
that provision for such needs is not available in the community; (2) [a]
person who is at least moderately mentally retarded and, because of his
retardation, needs and is susceptible to significant habilitation in an in-

stitution

62

When the hearing has been completed, if none of these standards have
been met through clear and convincing evidence, the respondent will
be immediately discharged, unless the Department of Rehabilitation
detain him, in which case he will be "returned
and Correction seeks to
63
to that department."
C.

Commitment

If at the conclusion of the full hearing the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill or retarded subject to hospitalization or institutionalization by court order, it shall
then order a commitment and send all relevant reports of the respon'
dent's condition to the place of commitment." Senate Bill 297 provides new criteria by which the nature of this commitment is to be
determined. Ohio Revised Code section 2945.40(D)(1) now sets forth
two factors which will be dispositive. First, the court must implement
65
The least
the "least restrictive commitment alternative" available.
second
the
by
however,
limited,
is
alternative
commitment
restrictive
a
commitsuch
that
is,
that
analyze;
factor which the trial court must
6
ment "must be consistent with the public safety."
Commitment of a person mentally ill subject to hospitalization is
done in accordance with divisions (C) through (E) of section 5122.15
62. A person who is "at least moderately mentally retarded" as used in subsection (N) of this section is defined in § 5123.68(0) of the Revised Code as:
[A] person who is found, following a comprehensive evaluation, to be impaired in
adaptive behavior to a moderate degree and to be functioning at the moderate
level of intellectual functioning in accordance with standard measurements as
recorded in the manual of terminology and classification in mental retardation,
1973 revision, American association on mental deficiency publication.
For further treatment on the subject of the mentally retarded and the law see generally
Mental Retardation and the Law, 13 CONT. L. REV. 588 (1978) (symposium); Mentally
Retarded People and the Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 541 (1979) (symposium).
63. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(B) (Page Supp. 1980).
64. Id. § 2945.40(C).
65. Id. § 2945.40(D)(1).
66. Id. See Bontempo, Memorandum to Senator M. Morris Jackson at 3 (April
29, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum to Senator Jackson] (copy on file with the
University of Dayton Law Review office). The author of the report notes that this is
the first time the court has been able to consider the public safety factor when making
the commitment determination.
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68
of the Revised Code. 67 Senate Bill 297 now makes mandatory an7 in69
itial ninety day commitment in one of seven possible facilities. 1 If
the court should choose to commit the person to a community health
center or an inpatient unit in such a center, commitment will 7be conditioned upon whether or not the facility has available space. '
Commitment of a mentally retarded person subject to institutionalization will be carried out according to divisions (C) through (E)
of section 5123.76.72 Upon such a finding, the court may order one of
73
five possible commitment alternatives for an initial ninety day detention period. 7" If the alternative chosen is either commitment to the care
of a private institution or individual, then such a commitment is condi75
tioned upon the consent of that party. In the case of a mentally
retarded person subject to institutionalization, as opposed to a mentally ill person, the court does have the option to discharge that person, if
it so chooses, at the completion of the full hearing.76

D. Conditional Release
1. Provisions for Determination of Conditional Release
Senate Bill 297 adds to section 2945.40 of the Revised Code a new
provision for conditional release of a person found not guilty by
reason of insanity.7 7 Under the new law, a conditional release is con67.
68.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(C) (Page Supp. 1980).

Prior to the passage of S.B. 297, even after a requisite showing of mental ill-

perness subject to hospitalization, the court still had the prerogative to discharge the
son rather than commit him for the initial ninety day period. The new amendment
eliminates this possibility, requiring all people found mentally ill subject to hospitaliza(Page 1981).
tion to be committed for an initial ninety day period. Id. § 5122.15(C)
to the
facility
possible
seventh
a
adds
297
Bill
Senate
69. See note 36 supra.
unit
original six provided under this section. The section now includes: "[ain inpatient
mental
of
division
the
by
licensed
center
health
mental
community
administered by a
health of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation under section
1981).
5123.16 of the Revised Code." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C)(7) (Page
70. Id. § 5122.15(C).
71. Id. § 5122.15(D).
72. Id. § 2945.40(C) (Page Supp. 1980).
73. The five commitment alternatives provided in § 5123.76(C)(1) are:
(a) [A] public institution;
(b) [A] private institution;
(c) [A] county mental retardation program;
(d) To receive private habilitation and care;
(e) [Any other suitable facility, program, or to the care of any person consistent
with the comprehensive evaluation, diagnosis, prognosis, and habilitation
needs of the respondent.
74. Id. See notes 116-120 and accompanying text infra.
75. OHIo REV CODE ANN. § 5123.76(D) (Page 1981).
76. Id. § 5123.76(C)(2).
77. Id. § 2945.40(D)(1)-(6) (Page Supp. 1980).
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sidered a continuing commitment. 8 A conditional release may be
ordered at the conclusion of the initial commitment hearing, or any
time during the commitment of a person found not guilty by reason of
insanity."9 In the latter instance, the conditional release must first be
recommended by the director of the-hospital, institution, or program
under which the respondent was initially committed."
In any conditional release hearing, the trial court must balance the
well being of the respondent against any risk to the public safety which
the respondent's release may create. 8 ' Whether or not a conditional
release will be granted, and the conditions which will be placed upon
that release, will be determined by the court's evaluation of each case
through this balancing process.
In addition to the respondent's personal welfare, S.B. 297 also
specifies a number of factors which must be taken into account in relation to the public safety consideration. Under the new law, the court
shall, in evaluating the potential risks to public safety, "consider the
current quantity of psychotropic drugs and other treatment the person
is receiving and the likelihood the person will continue to take the
drugs and continue the other treatment while on conditional
release." 82 When conditional release is ordered, the court "may set
any conditions on the release with respect to the treatment, evaluation,
counseling, or control of the respondent that insure the protection of
the public safety and welfare of the person. ' 83
2. Recommendation for Conditional Release by Supervising Agency
Upon a proposal by a hospital director or other supervising agency8 ' for conditional release of a person committed by court order, written notice must be sent to the trial court in which the person was found
not guilty by reason of insanity, the Attorney General's office, and the
prosecutor.8" The trial court and/or the prosecutor then have fifteen
days in which to request a full hearing upon the proposal. 6 When a
hearing is requested, it must be held within thirty days of such a re78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. § 2945.40(D)(1).
Id. § 2945.40(D)(4).

82.
83.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. § 2945.40(D)(1).

84. For the purposes of this note, the term supervising agency shall mean any type
of out-patient care of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity, including the
situation where a private individual has been charged with supervision of a person conditionally released.
85. Id. § 2945.40(D)(4).
86. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/10

LEGISLATION NOTES

19811

quest by the same trial judge who originally committed the person, or
7
by "another judge of the court with jurisdiction over the trial." If no
request for a hearing is set forth, the director or supervising agency
proposing the conditional release may authorize it according the provisions set out under division (D)(1) of Revised Code section 2945.40.88
3.

Provisions for Violation and Modification of Conditional Release

Upon violation of conditional release, the hospital or supervising
agency assigned to monitor the person must make an immediate report
to the trial court.' 9 A temporary seven day detention order may then
be issued by the court which may, either on its own initiative or by request of the prosecutor, hold a full hearing to determine whether a
violation actually took place, and if so, whether conditional release
should either be modified or terminated.'" Any hearing held on these
matters will be conducted in accordance with the provisions set out for
full hearings as codified in sections 2945.40 and 5122.15 of the Revised
Code."
Before a violation hearing, the trial court must give reasonable
notice to the prosecutor." The prosecutor will then represent the state
in attempting to show that the terms of the conditional release were
violated.' 3 If a supervising agency seeks to have the conditions of the
release modified, such a modification must be made pursuant to section 5122.15(L) and 5122.20 of the Revised Code.' 4
Section 5122.15(L) provides for transfer to a more restrictive setting during conditional release." In order to effect such a transfer, the
supervising agency must file a motion with the trial court requesting
the court to amend its original placement order." In emergency cases,
immediate transfer to a more restrictive setting may be made, immediately after which, the supervising agency must notify the court of
this transfer.' In either instance, a full hearing will be held at the pa87. Id. The provisions allowing for another judge of the trial court to decide upon
conditional release were incorporated to deal with the possibility that the original judge
may not still be on the bench at the time of this hearing. It is not a proposal that a different trier of fact preside at the different hearings. Murphy Interview, supra note 51.
88. OHIO REv CODE ANN. § 2945.40(D)(4) (Page Supp. 1980).
89. Id. § 2945.40(D)(3).
90. Id.
91.
92.

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. 88 5122.15(L), .20 (Page 1981).
Id. § 5122.15(L).
Id. § 5122.20.
Id. § 5122.15(L).
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tient's request.9" For the purposes of this hearing, the patient retains
the same rights accorded him in any full hearing held pursuant to sections 2945.40(A) and 5122.15 of the Revised Code. 99
Modifications to a less restrictive setting are made through section
2945.40(F) of the Revised Code.'°° To effect such a change, the supervising agency to which the person has been committed' 0 ' must send
written notice by certified mail of the proposed transfer to the trial
court in which the person was found not guilty by reason of insanity,
the Attorney General, and to the prosecutor.' 02 Such notice "shall include the hospital's or facility's report on the current status of the person and its recommendations concerning the pending action." 03
The trial court and/or the prosecutor may request a full hearing on
the transfer within fifteen days' 0 ' after notice has been received, with
notice of this request to be given to the head of the supervising agency
to which the person has been committed.' 5 If a hearing is not requested within fifteen days, the supervising agent may authorize the
less restrictive transfer. ' 0
If a hearing is requested, it shall be held in the court in which the
person was committed. 07 The prosecutor and Attorney General must
be given notice, within fifteen days, of the time and place of the hearing. ,o The hearing will be presided over by the committing trial judge
or any other judge in the trial court having jurisdiction over the
0 9
case. 1

At the hearing, the prosecutor will represent the position the state
assumes with regard to the transfer, while the Attorney General's office will represent the position of the hospital or facility involved if the
respondent has been so committed. "0 All hearings conducted under
98. Id. § 5122.20.
99. Id. See notes 47-59 and accompanying text supra.
100. The procedures outlined in § 2945.40(F) also apply to discharges, releases and
authorization of trial visits.
101. Such supervising agencies may include "the head of the hospital or facility,
managing officer of the institution, director of the program, chief of the division of
mental retardation and developmental disabilities or his designees, chief of the division
of mental health or his designee, or person to which the person is committed." OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(F) (Page Supp. 1980).
102. Id.
103.

104.
quested
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.

Senate Bill 297 changed the time period in which a hearing had to be refrom five to 15 days. Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Senate Bill 297 also changed the notice requirement from five to 15 days. Id.
Id.
Id. § 2945.40(G).
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this section will be done in accordance with the provisions set forth
under division (C) of Revised Code section 2945.40."' At the conclusion of the hearing, the court may authorize the transfer, or continue
the commitment."'
4. Termination of Conditional Release
Under S.B. 297, termination of conditional release occurs at what
would have been "the expiration of the maximum sentence the person
could have served in a penal institution had he been convicted of the
most serious offense for which he was found not guilty by reason of
insanity."". 3 At least ten days prior to the termination of a conditional
release, the trial court judge must notify the prosecutor who may then
file an affidavit for continued hospitalization or institutionalization of
the person whose conditional release is terminating.' 1' All hearings
deciding continued commitment must be conducted in accordance with
division (F) of section 2945.40 of the Revised Code.'"
E. Ninety Day Order; Limitations on Voluntary Commitment
1. Ninety Day Order
Any initial civil commitment will be ordered for a ninety day
period." 6 If no disposition of the case has taken place by the end of
the first ninety day period, the supervising agency must discharge the
person immediately, unless the prosecutor or the Attorney General's
office files an application for continued commitment at least ten days
before the end of this period."' Hearings resulting from such applications must take place at the end of the initial ninety day period, and
continued commitment hearings must be held at least every two years
111. Id. See notes 47-59 and accompanying text supra.
112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(F) (Page Supp. 1980).
113. Id. § 2945.40(D)(6).
114. Id.
115. Id. Section 2945.40(E) refers to §§ 5122.15(H) and 5123.76(H) in determining
procedures for the full hearing at this point in the proceeding. Both of these sections,
in turn, refer back to § 2945.40(F) and require a completion of the procedures found in
that section. All division (F) hearings in § 2945.40 are, of course, conducted according
to division (C) of that section. See generally notes 47-59 and accompanying text supra.
116. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (Page 1981).
117. Id. § 5122.15(H). Both offices must include in such an application:
[A] written report containing the diagnosis, prognosis, past treatment, a list of
alternative treatment settings and plans, and identification of the treatment setting
that is the least restrictive consistent with treatment needs. The prosecutor shall file
such written report at least three days prior to the full hearing. A copy of the application and written report shall be provided to the respondent's counsel immediately.

Id.
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after the expiration date of this period." 8 Hearings at the request of
the person committed will be held so long as the request has been made
more than one hundred and eighty" 9 days after the applicant's last full
hearing. 2
2.

Limitation on Voluntary Commitment

Under prior law, any person eighteen years of age or older, who
was, appeared to be, or believed himself to be mentally ill, was permitted to make a written application for voluntary admission to a mental
hospital or institution.'' The law also allowed the NGRI patient who
had been involuntarily committed to a facility to change his status by
applying for voluntary admission to the hospital, after which, he was
then free to voluntarily sign himself out.' 2 2
Under the provisions of S.B. 297, the NGRI patient is specifically
prohibited from voluntarily committing himself to a hospital or institution. 23 Two exceptions to this rule are provided. The first exception
occurs when the trial court has failed to find clear and convincing
evidence that the person is mentally ill or retarded subject to
hospitalization or institutionalization and the second occurs when an
involuntarily committed patient has received a discharge from his place
of commitment.' 2 In both instances the person involved is, by law, no
longer a NGRI patient, and thus voluntary commitment and discharge
may be effected.' 2 5
118. Id.
119. Senate Bill 297 increases the time, between the completion of the last full
hearing and the time the patient can request a new hearing, from 90 to 180 days. Id.
120. Id. "Last full hearing" as stated in the Revised Code refers to mandatory as
well as requested hearings. Id.
121. Id. § 5122.02(A)-(B) (Page Supp. 1979).
122. Id. § 5122.15(G).
123. Id. § 5122.15(G)(2) (Page 1981). This section reads: "A person who is found
not guilty by reason of insanity shall not voluntarily admit himself to a hospital, facility or person pursuant to division (G) (1) of this section.
Id.
124. Id. § 5122.15(G)(2)(a)-(b).
125. Id. § 5122.15(G)(1)-(2). In addition to procedural changes for voluntary commitment of NGRI patients, S.B. 297 revises the procedure for defendants found incompetent to stand trial. The bill establishes procedures for two potential situations.
The first involves, in addition to a finding of incompetence to stand trial, a determination by the court that, even provided with a course of treatment, there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent within one year. Id. §
2945.38(C) (Page 1981). Pursuant to such a finding, the court must file an affidavit
with the probate division alleging the person to be subject to hospitalization or institutionalization by court order. If involuntarily commited through the civil proceedings
governed by Chapter 5122 or 5123 of the Revised Code, the person may change his
status to voluntary commitment. When such a change in status is made, however, the
head of the hopsital must send written notice to the prosecutor. The prosecutor is
therefore afforded an opportunity to file an affidavit for commitment under either §

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss2/10

LEGISLATION NOTES

19811

An overview of the changes made by S.B. 297 in the NGRI commitment procedures indicates that the more meaningful steps taken by
the bill have been directed toward protecting the interests of the
public. The following analysis will note ways in which the interests of
the NGRI defendant may not have been given equal consideration and
suggestions will be made concerning concurrent accomodation of these
interests.
IV.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

The basic rationale supporting the enactment of S.B. 297 is founded upon three notions: (1) decisions affecting the people of a certain
county should be made by a court which is accountable to those people;'2 6 (2) the judge with the most knowledge of the issues of a particular case will be best equipped to efficiently handle the commitment
and release proceedings resulting from that case; 27 and (3) there is
both a right and a need for public awareness in such commitment proceedings."' The motivation underlying each of these seems to be a
5122.11 or § 5123.71 should a patient, who is determined to represent a substantial
danger if released, attempt voluntary release.
The second situation provided for by § 2945.38 is a finding by the trial court that the
person is incompetent to stand trial but there is a substantial probability that the person will become competent within one year if provided a course of treatment. Id. §
2945.38(D). Upon such a finding the court shall order the person committed to a facility for treatment. Under this section, however, no person may change his status to that
of a voluntary patient. Voluntary discharge is thus foreclosed. Upon expiration of 15
months or one-third of the minimum sentence which could be ordered for a conviction
of the most serious crime charged, a hearing will be held to determine competency to
stand trial. If the person is again determined to be incompetent disposition of his case
will be made in accordance with § 2945.38 of the Revised Code.
126. This point was enunciated by the bill's sponsor, State Senator M. Morris
Jackson: "This change [of jurisdiction from the probate court to the trial court] will
insure that the court that is most familiar with the case and that will be most accountable to the people of the county where the crime was committed, will make all decisions concerning commitment and release of a person found NGRI." Address by
Senator Jackson, supra note 5.
As stated by another senator: "ilt was our intention to leave that final decision
[regarding commitment or release] to a person who was politically responsible." Letter
from State Senator Richard H. Finan to Ned J. Nakles, Jr., and Frank Nagatani (Sept.
30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Finan Letter] (on file with the Unviersity of Dayton Law
Review office).
127. See note 126 supra.
128. The legal right of the public to know what transpires at commitment proceedings of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity is secured in S.B. 297's provision for open public hearings. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(A) (Page Supp.
1981).
It has also been suggested that open hearings in NGRI civil commitment cases may
allow for the public to obtain a better understanding of the procedures which are controlling in this area of the law. Interview with Marian Bontempo (Legislative Assistant
to Senator M. Morris Jackson) (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Bontempo Interview]
(on the file with the University of Dayton Law Review office).
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conviction that the public's interests must be adequately protected
through a more direct judicial process; one working both openly and
efficiently.
The change in jurisdiction for full hearings, along with the retention of the original trial court judge to conduct such hearings, and the
addition of the prosecutor to the proceedings, all seem to speak to the
aforementioned public safety concerns, while the new conditional
release provisions seem .to indicate concern for the well being of the
person found NGRI. While the actual effectiveness of each of these
changes and additions may likely depend in large part upon their actual application, they do present some possible difficulties which will
be evaluated more closely below. Of specific concern are the possible
problems the trial judge may face in his new role in full commitment
hearings as well as the statutory dilemmas posed by commitment standards of proof as they interrelate with the conditional release provisions incorporated into the law by S.B. 297.
A. Effects of the JurisdictionalChange Upon the Trial Judge
Prior to passage of S.B. 297, most continued commitment hearings
were held in the Allen County Probate Court. 2 9 It was felt by the bill's
sponsors that the court was not accountable to the people in the county
where the crime actually took place. The end result of this concern was a
jurisdictional change which now allows the same trial court in which the
respondent is originally found NGRI to retain jurisdiction over all ensuing civil commitment hearings, with the same trial judge maintaining
authority over these proceedings. 3 ' Thus it is quite logical to assume that
through this change, the judge most acquainted with the case will be
presiding over it. The more important inquiry, however, is whether or
not it is truly more effective to have such a judge presiding over both the
criminal trial as well as the full civil commitment hearings.
As a result of the addition of the prosecutor to the civil commitment
proceedings, and coupled with provisions making such proceedings open
to the public, S.B. 297 has effectively created what could be termed an
"open adversarial arena" and it is within this arena that issues concerning the insanity plea must now be litigated. Because this plea often tends
to create great community apprehension and general opposition,' 3 ' and
129.

Memorandum to Senator Jackson, supra note 66. See generally notes 33-38

and accompanying text supra.
130. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.40(A) (Page Supp. 1981). See generally notes
39-41 and accompanying text supra.

131. Michael Perlin, Director of Mental Health Advocacy, Dept. of the Public Advocate in New Jersey, notes that "while the academically interesting but empirically
fruitless debate rages on concerning the issue of abolition of the insanity defense, there
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because many NGRI cases receive extensive media coverage, '3 it is quite
possible that actions taken by the trial court judge during commitment
hearings will come under much closer public scrutiny and quite possibly,
public pressure Additionally, the trial judge's responsibility may be heightened by
the fact that criminal defendants often tend to waive a jury trial in the
first instance when they intend to plead NGRI.' 3 4 As a result, the trial
court judge may become even more of a focal point in the proceedings
because in such instances he will make both criminal and civil adjudications. ' Thus, he now must assume the burden of separating the comhas been little analytical attention paid to the fate of those found not guilty by reason
of insanity .... "The author posits the possibility that this lack of focus as to the paramount issues involved in the insanity defense is the main cause of misunderstandings in
this area. He eloquently asserts that "the 'Son-of-Sam'--type of case stokes political
ferment and inspires demagoguery on all sides... ." Perlin, Apres the Acquittal, Le
Deluge: Release Procedures and Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Subsequent
Review Hearings Following a Finding of "Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity," 7 BULL.
Am. ACAD. OF PSYCH. L. 29 (1979); see generally Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry,
Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent Offender, 69 J. CRIM L.C. 226 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Steadman & Cocozza].
132. Media coverage may occasionally encourage community apprehension and
opposition by creating confusion in the public concerning this area of the law. The
tragic shooting death of singer John Lennon, and its aftermath, serve as a case in
point. The accused defendant, Mark David Chapman, eventually pleaded innocent by
reason of insanity, but not until newspapers had printed front page headlines and lead
stories such as the following:
Accused Lennon killer possibly hid psychic 'demon'; Psychic 'demon' blamed:
Mark David Chapman apparently tried to conceal the psychic demon gnawing at
him, a 'demon' that may have deluded him into thinking he was John Lennon
and eventually led him to kill the real Lennon, according to a leading psychiatrist
here ....

Behind the competent facade ....

there was apparently a second Chap-

man doubting who he really was and perhaps regarding ex-Beatle Lennon as a
threat to his mental well being.
Dayton Daily News, Dec. 11, 1980, at 1, col. 1 (evening ed.).
133. Virtually all proponents of S.B. 297 agree that there will be increasing public
pressure on the trial judge making the civil commitment decision. Nevertheless, the rationale put forth in support of these changes seem to be premised upon an increased
trust in the competence of the trial judge. Basic suppositions that trial judges are sworn
to uphold the law despite public pressure, and that such judges make decisions in many
other pressure situations, are put forth to buttress the argument that the jurisdictional
changes will lead to fair and efficient litigation on these matters. See Bontempo Interview, supra note 128; Fman Letter, supra note 126; Murphy Interview, supra note 51.
134. Interview with Dr. Phillip Resnick (Sept. 20, 1980) Ihereinafter cited as
Resnick Interview] (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review office). See note
4 supra. Ohio keeps no statistics on the frequency of jury trial waiver. The validity for
Dr. Resnick's statement, however, was confirmed by a telephone survey to the prosecutor's office in six of the largest counties in Ohio as well as the Ohio Attorney
General's office. (Survey information on file with the University of Dayton Law
Review Office).
135. Under amended § 2945.40 of the Revised Code the trial court juadge who found
the respondent NGRI will have to make a probable cause determination and all
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plex issues which must be determined at each stage of the process,"'
while at the same time not allowing outside public pressure to force a
possible compromise of one decision in order to lay the groundwork for
another later in the proceedings.' 37
Other potential difficulties a trial judge may face in his new dual role
are noted by June German and Ann Singer in their article 38
' on the subject of NGRI commitment, in which they note:
commitment and continued commitment decisions.

OHIO REV.

CODE ANN.

§

2945.40(A) (Page 1981).
136. The standard of proof in the initial decision as to criminal responsibility differs from that controlling in the civil commitment decision. Compare the standard of
proof in State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 21, 247 N.E.2d 293, 299 (1969) (see note 21
and accompanying text supra.) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.01(B)(l)-(4),
5123.68(N)(1)-(2) (Page 1981) (see notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra). See
generally note 41 supra. A finding of NGRI is necessarily a determination of a lack of
criminal responsibility at the time of the allegedly criminal act. This determination
must be distinguished from the civil commitment determination. The latter adjudication seeks to decide whether or not the dangerousness standards of sections
5122.01(B)(l)-(4) and 5123.68(N)(l)-(2) are affirmatively shown through clear and convincing evidence. This is a determination of the respondent's present mental state. See
Caulfield, Ohio Commitments of the Mentally Ill Offender, 4 CAP. U. L. REV. 1,
20-21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Caulfield]. The author suggests elements which
should be controlling in an evaluation of the present mental state of a person once they
have been found NGRI:
A test of sanity must, of necessity, deal with a present evaluation of the individual's present mental condition, and its effect, if any, on the individual's ability to know or refrain from an undetermined number and variety of criminally
wrongful actions, actions which might face the individual in the form of crucial
decisions, should he be returned to society.
Id.
137. With the addition of the prosecutor to the commitment hearings, the situation
is created wherein all parties to the criminal as well as civil decisions will remain the
same. This creates an interesting, if not potentially troubling, situation much the same
as that noted in a commentary to New York's civil commitment procedures:
The whole scheme is premised on the prosecutor's burden, presumably civil in
nature ... to satisfy the court as to each level of commitment or change in status.
The practical consequence here is that prosecutors will remain principle actors in
civil, dare we call them quasi-civil, proceedings far beyond any former role; really
they are in it from the cradle to grave even though the whole thrust of the 'reform'
is to terminate the criminal phase entirely and substitute a civil proceeding.
Moreover, the prosecutor's role is ambivalent at best and potentially conflicting,
intellectually and practically. Whereas, either at plea or trial, the prosecutor was
protagonist for the criminal responsibility, he must now, having lost on the
responsibility issue, turn 180 degrees or so into the wind and become protagonist
for the converse view, i.e., the dangerous mental disorder or mental illness that
will keep the former defendant confined as an involuntary committed person.
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 330.20 app., at 16 (McKinney 1973) (emphasis added).
138. German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
German & Singer]. At the time the article was written Ms. German was the Supervising
Attorney, Mental Health Information Service, First Judicial Department, New York
and Ms. Singer was the Assistant Deputy Public Advocate, New Jersey Department of
the Public Advocate, Division of Mental Health Advocacy.
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[Tihere are ...good reasons for having a different trier of fact decide the
issue of present insanity. A defendant will almost inevitably find himself
prejudiced in an attempt to demonstrate present sanity when he has just
vociferously argued that he was mentally irresponsible at the time of the
crime. The trier of fact is likely to have this argument, as well as the details
of the crime, uppermost in his mind when deciding the issue of present
sanity. On the other hand, a defendant who knows that the same fact
finder will be deciding whether to commit him may be deterred from argu39
ing an insanity defense at all.
This view as to the inability of a trial court judge to be able to be
an effective fact finder in both the criminal trial and the civil commitment determinations is refuted by Professor Raymond Spring, writing
on the question of the continuing effectiveness of the insanity
defense." 0 Professor Spring notes that evidence adduced regarding the
determination of a respondent's mental state, for the purposes of the
criminal trial, is often the same evidence brought forth during the civil
commitment proceedings which follow. He asserts that this evidence is
often quite clear, and thus, in order to avoid a simple replay of it during the civil proceeding, the determination of present mental state for
commitment purposes can be made by the same trier of fact during the
regular criminal proceeding. In order to allow the defendant to bring
forth evidence of present sanity, the trial court judge can, if he
chooses, bifurcate the trial and have this separate evidence presented
after the initial verdict on the insanity plea."'
The two jurisdictions in which this issue has been examined have
tended to ally, in theory if not form, more closely to the German3
4
Singer line of reasoning.' " In In re Franklin,'" the California Supreme
139. Id. at 1034. The basic position taken by the authors is that a person acquitted
by reason of insanity should not undergo a different or more stringent process than
would any other person who is being civilly committed. They assert that a person, who
has been adjudged not to have had the criminal capacity to have committed an act,
must not therefore, be held responsible for the commission of that act. The authors
contend that the fact that the respondent has pleaded guilty in the criminal trial does
not guarantee that by the time the commitment decision is to be made he may not be
restored to the degree of sanity which would allow for some type of release, either
outright or conditional. Thus they perceive a "catch-22" type situation for the respondent, who as a matter of procedural wisdom, may be constrained from asserting the insanity defense at the criminal trial when the possibility exists that a harsh civil commitment may be ordered as a result of the court's efforts to, in a sense, modify an initial
NGRI verdict. Id.
140. Spring, The End of Insanity, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 23 (1979). Prof. Spring was
Professor of Law at Washburn Unviersity School of Law at the time the article was
written.
141. Id. at 35.
142. The cases chosen as representative of these jurisdictions have involved juries
as fact finders in both the criminal proceedings and the civil commitment proceedings.
Since, under the provisions of S.B. 297, a trial court judge will make the civil commit-
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Court, addressed the issue from the standpoint of having the same jury
decide on both criminal and civil issues and held:
[l]t would be unfair to the defendant himself, for he would be in the
position of attempting to convince the same persons who believed him
once insane that he has recovered his sanity, a finding which runs counter
to the 'almost . . . common knowledge that insanity is for most part a
long lasting phenomenon." "'

Franklin did not, however, specify whether the same rationale would
hold in the instance where a judge was the same trier of fact. Also,
while it can be argued that the situations are much alike, seemingly
there is a great degree of difference between the judicial competence of
a trial court judge and that of a jury member insofar as understanding
the insanity issues involved.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in deciding State v. Krol, 1"5
employed a rationale similar to that found in Franklin. That case involved a situation where a jury was being called upon to make a
simultaneous decision on both the criminal responsibility and the civil
commitment questions.'" The court held that due to the inherent difficulty of this procedure, the decision regarding commitment was to be
placed wholly in the hands of the trial judge for separate determination
after the trial.'
ment decision, the possibility of the same jury making tmese decisions is not present.
The cases examined are to some extent, however, analogous to the procedures as set
forth in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(A) (Page 1980) in that, under this section,
there is a very real possibility that the same trier of fact will be making all relevant
determinations. Further, even when the original case is decided by a jury, the trial
court judge will still be placed in a position where, by hearing the testimony in that instance, he may have difficulty separating the issues which should be determinative in
the civil commitment proceedings from those which were dispositive in the criminal
trial. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
143. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
144. Id. at 144, 496 P.2d at 476, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 564. Many insanity statutes were
developed in line with the notion that insanity is a continuing condition until legally
proven otherwise. For further discussion on the presumption of continuing insanity
and its effects on civil statutes in this area, see Comment, Commitment Following Acquittal by Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 924 (1968); Note, Release From Confinement of Persons Acquitted by Reason of
Insanity in New Jersey, 27 RUTGERs L. REV. 160 (1973).

145.

68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975).

146.

Id.

147. Id. at 264, 344 A.2d at 304 (footnotes omitted), The court enumerated The
possible problems arising from such a procedure by stating:
[R]equiring [the] defendant to simultaneously argue to the jury both that he was
insane at the time of the crime and that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous
places him in a difficult and unfair tactical position. He may reasonably fear that
the jury will be very loath to reach a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if
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Obviously the facts in Krol make that holding distinguishable to
some extent from the provisions of Revised Code section 2945.40(A) in
that Krol dealt with a simultaneous decision on both civil and criminal
issues. While at cursory glance it may seem that the procedure called
for under section 2945.40(A) is in line with the holding of Krol, the
question is still left open as to whether Krol is calling for a trial judge
determination in all civil commitment hearings, or whether it was
speaking mainly to the need of having a different trier of fact preside
8
over such hearings." 4
A possible alternative to the procedure which Revised Code section
2945.40(A) establishes is to conduct commitment hearings in the probate court of the county in which the original criminal trial took
place.", Because the trial court judge would no longer have to conduct
civil hearings, much of the potential public pressure he may experience
with regard to the NGRI decision should be eliminated since his role
will end after the trial. Yet at the same time, by keeping the situs of the
commitment hearing in the same county where the criminal trial was
held, the public safety and accountability factors which S.B. 297 seeks
to incorporate would not be sacrificed, and a better balance with the
respondent's rights may be maintained.
B.

Conditional Release; Statutory Complications

1. Overview of Conditional Release: The Need for Alternatives in
Treatment
Recent studies indicate that persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity are not dangerous per se, and in fact are, in some instances,
he successfully demonstrates that he is no longer dangerous and must be released
upon such a verdict. This fear may well deter him from vigorously arguing present
sanity and lack of dangerousness under such circumstances.
Id.
148. See German & Singer, supra note 138, at 1034 n. 103. The authors suggest that
the language in Krol, quoted in note 147 supra, would seem to indicate the need for a
different judge to make the civil commitment determination. Id. For further treatment
of the trier of fact issue, see generally Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REV. 849-50 (1960).
149. This suggestion was originally proposed by various groups having input into
the drafting of S.B. 297. See, e.g., Report, The Cuyahoga County Bar Association
Position Regarding the Insanity Defense (April 1980) (copy on file with the University
of Dayton Law Review office). "iThe issue . . . should be determined in the probate
court of the community where the crime took place." Id.; see generally Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, Suggested Amendment to S.B. 297
(on file with the Ohio Legislative Service Commission Library, Columbus, Ohio). This
amendment sought to keep the NGRI civil commitment proceedings in the probate
court.
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likely to be less dangerous than a member of the general population. ,'
Hospitalization, once thought to be the only means of remedial care
for the mentally ill, is now undergoing a much closer analysis so as to
determine its true effectiveness. As a result, symptoms once thought to
indicate mental illness are now being discovered to be the direct, or indirect results of hospitalization and institutionalization. ''
The ineffectiveness of hospitalization or institutionalization in
150. See Steadman & Cocozza, supra note 131, at 227-31. The authors set forth the
results of a study they conducted upon a group of 967 mental patients who had been
held in maximum security correctional hospitals and had, in 1966, been transferred out
of these facilities against psychiatric advice in accordance with the Supreme Court's
decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The study indicated that only
three percent of these patients exhibited violent behavior sufficient to warrant a return
to the maximum security facilities. Although 20% were later arrested for some violation, only two percent were actually convicted of crimes in the nature of assault. Steadman & Cocozza, supra note 131, at 227. See Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1087-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cocozza, Steadman). The
authors appraise a group of studies which sought to evaluate the dangerousness of
mental patients solely through an examination of the percentages of those arrested
after release, as compared to the arrest rates of the general public. They note a series of
earlier studies which indicated that past mental patients had a lower arrest record than
the general public. Id. at 1088 n.22. They also point to a study by Zitrin et al which indicated that out of a group of 1,000 patients, the arrest rates for crimes of murder and
robbery were lower than those of the same number of the general public. Id. at 1089.
. 151. For a discussion of a series of case studies dealing with hospital treatment of
the mentally ill, see DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and Drug
Treatment: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MINN.
L. REV. 1149 (1976). These studies indicate that, in many cases, prolonged hospitalization will often compound the patient's difficulties or retard speedy improvement of
their mental condition. Id. This view is aptly summarized in Chambers, Alternatives to
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108 (1972) where the author states:
Nearly all long term hospital patients exhibit flatness of response, withdrawal,
muteness, and loss of motivation. Once believed to be part of the degenerative
process of mental illness, these phenomena are now universally accepted--even by
public hospital administrators-as responses to hospitalization itself superimposed
on the difficulties of illness.
Id. at 1127.
A further problem regarding hospitalization and institutionalization is posited by
David Wexler in his book, Criminal Commitments and Dangerous Mental Patients:
Legal Issues of Confinement, Treatment, and Release (1977). The author notes that
when the release decision is left solely to the hospital, in cases where a patient has been
found NGRI, there may be a tendency for the facility to detain him longer than usual
due to the fear that, should he commit a later crime, the hospital's error of judgment
will receive the full attention of the public. Wexler asserts that, in order to avoid this
problem, release decisions must be given the status of a recommendation which will
later be acted upon by a trial judge. Such a measure would allow the hospital to function without the overriding fear of psychiatric error, and as a result, better treatment
and possibly less restrictive commitment alternatives would be present for the NGRI
patient.
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many instances, was recognized by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in the landmark decision of State v. Carter.' The court discussed the
possibility of alternative methods of treatment for NGRI committees
and held that while "some patients will be faced with lifetime commitment .. .we can discern no . . . [purpose in] confin[ing] others for
those periods during which they may be capable of functioning in
society so long as reasonable assurances are provided that no harm will
come to the public."'5 3 Acceptance of the Carter rationale has been instrumental in bringing forth, in all states, some sort of provision,
either statutory or by judicial decision, regarding conditional
release. ""

The conditional release provisions added to Title 29 of the Ohio
Revised Code by S.B. 297.5

are complete insofar as providing for a

less restrictive alternative setting, termination, and a hearing to determine violations. In two areas, however, the conditional release rules
mandated by this law, may lead to potential problems in application.
These two areas, the openendedness of provisions for setting conditions and the contradiction between commitment and release standards, are examined below.
2.

Openendedness in Condition-setting Provisions

Division (D)(1) of Ohio Revised Code section 2945.40 allows the
trial court judge to "set any conditions on the release with respect to
treatment, evaluation, counseling or control of the respondent that insure the protection of the public safety and the welfare of the
person.'"'" The terms "protection of the public safety" and "welfare
of the person" are very openended, and are not qualified by any other
portion of the statute. Since S.B. 297 mandates that trial judges in
every county will now be setting conditions for release, a possible problem of statewide consistency in those conditions may result."' When
such consistency is not present, each judge becomes free to set conditions in accord with that degree of restrictiveness which he alone deems
152.
153.
154.
German
155.
156.

64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974).
Id. at 389, 316 A.2d at 453.
For a fairly recent summary of conditional release provisions in each state, see
& Singer, supra note 138, at 1075-83.
See notes 77-112 and accompanying text supra.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(D)(1) (Page Supp. 1980).

157. Resnick Interview, supra note 134. Dr. Resnick points to the great diversity in
the counties of Ohio, and asserts that because of such diversity and due to the fact that
the statutory language of § 2945.40(D) provides no "measuring stick" which all judges
can follow in setting conditions for release, the end product will become a highly subjective decision for judges in each county.
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necessary."' This may result in a quandry on the part of both counsel

for the respondent and the prosecutor for the state when seeking to
present a conditional release case before a particular judge since they
may be without the aid of suitable and consistent standards from
which to work.'"
3.

Statutory Contradiction in the Commitment and Conditional
Release Provisions
The addition of the conditional release provisions into the law

creates a statutory inconsistency between the procedures set out by
158. This problem is well illustrated in a case where the patient is being restored to
sanity through the use of psychotropic medicine. Judges statewide may be able to
make an endless variety of decisions regarding the effectiveness of such medicine. Examples of the possible resulting disparity are: (1) United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d
872, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 1972), in which the court held that "[hiostility and uncooperativeness are thought to be especially amenable to drug therapy. Within two
weeks major tranquilizers may end hallucinations and delusional ideas, and under
medication . . . ' [t]he sullen, sarcastic and antagonistic patient is less irritable and frequently becomes quiet, cooperative, and accessible' "; and (2) the "all or nothing"
holding of Wolonsky v. Balson, 58 Ohio App. 2d 25, 387 N.E.2d 738 (1976), that a
person who could conform his conduct to the law only through the use of medication
could not be considered to have been restored to sanity.
159. See Resnick Interview, supra note 134. Dr. Resnick suggests that where no objective standards for conditional release exist, a judge, surrounded by so many conflicting factors found in NGRI hearings, may tend to simply make a "gut level
judgment." Such a judgment would create a two-tiered level of subjectivity, with the
first level being that of statewide inconsistencies, and the second being inconsistencies
within each individual judge's decisions.
An examination of another jurisdiction's treatment of this problem may offer a
useful solution. The conditional release provision in the Oregon Revised Statutes
establishes a statewide board which is charged with supervision and direction of all persons civilly committed following a finding of "not responsible on grounds of diseaseor
defect." OR. REV. STAT. § 161.325 (1977). A major responsibility of this statewide
Psychiatric Security Review Board is the setting of conditional release provisions in
each case. Id. at § 161.336. The Board is made up of five members, each representing a
different group which is involved with, or potentially affected by, the commitment and
release process. More specifically, the members include:
(1) a psychiatrist with experience in the criminal justice system;
(2) a licensed psychologist experienced in the criminal justice system;
(3) a person with substantial experience in the processes of parole and probation;
(4) a member of the general public; and
(5) a lawyer with substantial experience in criminal trial practice.
Id. at § 161.385(2)(a)-(e). All members are appointed by the governor of the state, subject to approval by the state Senate, and all serve set terms. Id.
One statewide entity such as Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review Board may provide for a more thoughtful and consistent manner of review. By having all conditional
release provisions set by one central board, the possibility of diverse or inconsistent
results may be minimized. Additionally, the decisions of such a board would not be
subject to the same degree of public pressure as those of a trial judge holding an
elected office. The trade-off, however, is the concern for keeping the proceedings in
the county where the criminal act was committed. See notes 33-46 and accompanying
text supra.
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S.B. 297's amendment to Revised Code section 2945.40 and those retained under section 5122.01(B)(l)-(4). The inconsistency arises since,
in order to avoid an immediate discharge at any full hearing, the state
must prove by clear and convincing evidence' 60 that the respondent is
"presently dangerous" under one of the provisions set forth in section
5122.01(B)(l)-(4). "' Thus while it is entirely possible that the respondent may be fit for, and would benefit from conditional release at the
time of the initial commitment hearing 2 or a later continued commitment hearing, his chances of securing it may be effectively lessened
after a successful showing of present dangerousness on the part of the
state.'" Such a result is likely since the trial judge making the commitment and conditional release decisions will be placed in the awkward
position of having to justify a conditional release, in many cases back
to public life, promptly after a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent released is "presently dangerous to
himself and others.'"

In some instances the state may favor condi-

tional release as a means of continued commitment, yet since it must
assert that the respondent meets the present dangerous standards of
section 5122.01(B)(l)-(4), it too places itself in the same position as
that of the trial judge, seeming to favor release for a person considered
presently dangerous.'

One possible solution to the conflict between the commitment stan160. Although it is technically impossible to fractionalize human judgment, various
legal commentators seem to agree that a showing of clear and convincing evidence will
be met when the fact finder can accord approximately 75% certainty to his decision.
See Cocozza, Steadman, supra note 150, at 1101.
161. See text accompanying note 61 supra for the four tests in OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 5122.01 (B) (Page 1981).
162. Conditional release may be in order even at the time of the initial full hearing
on civil commitment. In many instances, the time span between the initial detention
and the end of the criminal trial may afford the respondent adequate opportunity to
recover his sanity to such a degree that, with adequate care, treatment, or monitoring
he will be better able to recover than he would be under continued hospitalization or
continued institutionalization. This possibility is furthered by the new developments in
the area of psychotropic drugs. See note 158 supra; Bontempo Interview; supra note
128.
163. For further discussion of the assessment of dangerousness as well as the components of a workable civil commitment law, see Albers, Pasewark, Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric'Testimony: The Falibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. L. REV. 11 (1976); Arons, Working In the "Cuckoo's
Nest ":An Essay on Recent Changes In Mental Health Law and the Changing Role of
Psychiatrists In Relation to Patient and Society, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 73 (1977).
164. Resnick Letter, supra note 4.
165. It is suggested that to avoid statutory contradiction, a psychiatrist for the
state, in seeking conditional release as a form of commitment, may testify that the
respondent may qualify under the provisions of § 5122.01(l)-(4) "in their broadest
sense," but that such a qualification should not preclude him from being granted conditional release. Resnick Interview, supra note 134.
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dards and the provisional release provisions is the addition of a fifth
dangerousness standard to section 5122.01(B) of the Ohio Revised
Code; one which would recognize the fact that the respondent is
presently dangerous, but may nonetheless be a suitable candidate for
conditional release so long as proper care or treatment is provided.
Section 161.336(1)of the Oregon Revised Statutes suggests such a standard:
[Upon determination] that the person presents a substantial danger to
himself or others but that he can be adequately controlled with supervision . . . and treatment is available, [he may be ordered] conditionally
released subject to those supervisory orders ... as are in the best interests
of justice, the protection of society and the welfare of the person. 16
A similar provision in the Ohio Revised Code would permit statutory
recognition that the behavior of sometimes dangerous people can be
modified and controlled through proper treatment and monitoring
rather than hospitalization or institutionalization.167
C.

The ConstitutionalIssue

1.

Basic Freedom Involved

Upon a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court is
authorized to conduct a hearing to determine whether the person is a
mentally ill person subject to hospitalization or a mentally retarded
person subject to institutionalization. If the trial court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill or mentally
retarded, the person will be committed to a hospital or institution as
deemed appropriate by the trial court. 6 8
The civil commitment procedure for mentally ill or mentally
retarded persons to appropriate institutions for confinement and care,
when reasonably necessary for the protection of the public or for the
safety of the person himself, is accomplished under the exercise of the
police power of the state. '69 This use of police power, however, must
be viewed in light of the fact that by involuntarily committing a per166. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.336(1) (1977).
167. See note 162 supra.
168. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980).
169. The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), granted
certiorari to determine if a Florida state hospital had intentionally and maliciously
deprived a mental patient of his constitutional right to liberty. The Court held that
Donaldson's right had been breached but in a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger
stated: "There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a State may
confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial
acts or communicable disease." Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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son, the state is denying him the basic right of liberty, guaranteed to all
persons by the United States Constitution. 7 ' The fourteenth amendment provides in part that:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. 17'
The Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe,'" although not defining
"liberty" with any great precision, stated that liberty extends to the
full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue including
freedom from bodily restraint. The court also made it clear that this
basic right cannot be encroached upon except for a proper governmen"
tal objective.' 7 3 The Supreme Court in O'Connorv. Donaldson also
confronted the question concerning every person's constitutional right
to liberty. Donaldson was involuntarily civilly committed to a Florida
state hospital for nearly 15 years after being found to be suffering
from paranoid schizophrenia. A suit was brought against the hospital
superintendent alleging he had denied Donaldson's subsequent release,
even though he was found to be dangerous to no one and his release
had been supported by responsible persons willing to provide him any
care he might need on release. The Court held that absent a constitutionally adequate basis for further confinement, the hospital had no
right to hold Donaldson against his wishes and that the jury's award
for compensatory and punitive damages for deprivation of his liberty
was justified."
Boiling and O'Connor explicitly establish the principle that an individual's freedom is a basic right protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the government may infringe upon this right, it must
170 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
171. Id.
172. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The issue addressed by the Court involved an
individual's deprivation of liberty through segregation in public education.
173. Id.
174. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Burger stated:
There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty
which the state cannot accomplish without due process of law .... Commitment
must be justified on the basis of a legitimate State interest, and the reasons for
committing a particular individual must be established in an appropriate proceeding.
Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

175.

Id.
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do so in an even-handed manner. The fourteenth amendment'7 6 also
guarantees that the government treat similar individuals in a similar
manner.' 7 The government may classify persons in the creation and
application of laws but those classifications may not be used to arbitrarily burden a group of individuals. In general, the classification
will be constitutionally valid if it relates to a proper governmental objective. 8 The following sections will analyze the classification involved in S.B. 297 and the validity of the underlying governmental objective.
2.

Conflicting Commitment Procedures

Senate Bill 297 changes the procedure the NGRI patient must
follow for involuntary commitment by court order which is necessary
to gain conditional release or discharge after commitment.' 79 This procedure differs from the procedure used for persons civilly committed.
Under the new law the NGRI's hearings for commitment and for conditional release or discharge are held in the trial court which found the
person not guilty by reason of insanity. Prior to S.B. 297, commitment
and release hearings were held for both the NGRI's and civil committees in the probate court. Senate Bill 297 also provides that the trial
judge preside over the hearing which shall be open to the public with
the prosecutor taking an active role in the proceeding as a representative of the public's interest. 8 " The bill now mandates that the trial
court evaluate the potential risks to public safety and the welfare of the
person in its determination to commit, release or discharge.' 8 '
For purposes of involuntary commitment after a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant must now contend with the
arguments of the prosecutor acting in an adversarial role representing
the public's interest. For purposes of conditional release or discharge,
the NGRI patient must first secure recommendation from the hospital
that he has recovered his sanity to the point where release is warranted.
He must also prove recovery to the trial court judge and possibly overcome the prosecutor's arguments against his release or discharge."'
Therefore, despite the acquittal, the NGRI patient is not treated in
the same manner as those civilly committed. Senate Bill 297 in effect,
176.
177.
(1978).
178.
179.

See text accompanying note 171 supra.
See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 519
Id. See note 211 and accompanying text infra.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980).

180.

Id.

181.

Id. § 2945.40(D).

182.

See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980).
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places the NGRI patients into a classification whereby their basic rights
to liberty and freedom are harder to regain than those civil committees
similarly situated.
There are cogent reasons for the Ohio Legislature to take precautions for the public's safety especially when the NGRI patient has
previously shown violent or dangerous tendencies. 83' Although an attempt to ensure the safety of the public as well as the patient may be a
laudable purpose, the differing procedural requirements for NGRI patients may be subject to equal protection challenges. 8 "
3.

Judicial Response

In drafting S.B. 297, United States v. Ecker 185 and United States
v. Ecker Hf86 were used as the basis for justifying the different release
treatment for those found NGRI and civil committees. 81 The United
States Court of Appeals in Ecker I affirmed the district court's decision to deny conditional release to Ecker who had been found NGRI
on separate counts of felony murder and rape. Three years later the
court of appeals in Ecker H again affirmed the district court's refusal
to grant conditional release to Ecker. The court also upheld a constitutional attack on the District of Columbia Code which permitted different treatment for purposes of release between NGRI patients and
those civilly committed.188 The court held that differences in release
183. Under its police power, the state may confine individuals to protect the public
from significant antisocial acts. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); see Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally 1l, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974). "Protection from the dangerously insane
is a traditional use of the police power and is a prominent purpose of most modem
commitment statutes." Id. at 1223.
184. See Finan Letter, supra note 126. In Senator Finan's opinion, a major problem with the bill may be the question of constitutionality. "A person who has been
judged not guilty by reason of insanity is actually not convicted of anything.
Thereafter, how much control will the Supreme Court of the United States allow us to
maintain over a nonconvict?" Id. A similar opinion was expressed by Dr. Phillip
Resnick who believes that S.B. 297 may be vulnerable to equal protection challenges
because once the defendant has been determined NGRI, the trial court should not have
any more to say or do with the patient. Resnick Interview, supra note 134.
185. 479 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
186. 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
187. Bontempo Interview, supra note 128.
188. See 24 D.C. CODE ANN. § 301(e) (1973). This section provides for the release
of NGRI patients confined in a hospital for the mentally ill. In general, the section
provides that the superintendent of the hospital must certify that the patient has
recovered his sanity, that he will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself
or others, and he is entitled to unconditional release. This certificate must be filed with
the clerk of the court in which the person was tried and a copy served with the prosecutor. The certificate is sufficient authorization for the court to unconditionally
release the patient. Alternatively, the court may, at its discretion or upon objection by

Published by eCommons, 1981

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 6:2

hearings between these two classes of patients did not deny Ecker
equal protection of the law.' 8 9 The Ecker II court justified the difference in release treatment of Ecker based on the fact that he had in
the past committed violent acts. 90
' The public's safety and the patient's
welfare were taken into consideration and conditional release was
denied as Ecker had failed to prove to the court that he "will not in the
reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others."' 9 '
Other court decisions support S.B. 297's procedural requirements
for NGRI patients. The implication from these cases is that the NGRI
acquittees are not in the same classification as their civil counterparts
because they pose a greater danger to the public or themselves as
evidenced by their recent anti-social acts. In Bolton v. Harris,192 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that persons found NGRI must be afforded procedures
"substantially similar" to civil committees. The court, however, found
no equal protection violation in allowing court review of the hospital's
decision to release an NGRI patient, even though this review was not
applicable to those civilly committed.' 93 The court also held it was permissible for the NGRI acquittee to be committed without a hearing for
the period required to determine his present mental condition.' 94
In a later case from the same circuit, United States v. Brown,'" the
court of appeals held that the proper standard to determine whether an
NGRI defendant should be involuntarily committed to a mental
hospital was by a preponderance of the evidence. For those civilly
committed, however, the state needed to establish a higher burden of
the United States or the District of Columbia, hold a hearing to determine the sanity
and dangerousness of the patient. Upon weighing the evidence the court may order the
patient unconditionally released or returned to the hospital. Similar provisions are

made for conditional release.
189.
190.

543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
Judge Wilkey writing for the majority stated that:

[tihe existence of a 'substantial problem of danger in the reasonable future' provides an adequate basis for the continued detention and confinement of an insanity acquitee who, like Ecker, has committed a violent criminal act-unless the
district court can make an 'affirmative finding that it is at least more probable
than not that he will not be violently dangerous in the future.'
Id. at 188.
191. Id. at 187 (citing Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
192. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Bolton was acquitted of auto theft after being
found NGRI and committed to a hospital pursuant to 24 D.C. CODE ANN. § 301(d).
Three months later the district court denied his petition for habeas corpus relief. He
appealed, alleging that § 301(d) provisions violated equal protection because they did

not provide safeguards afforded other civil committees.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 651.
195. 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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proof before commitment could be ordered.' 9 Brown had been acquitted by reason of insanity, of robbery, assault with a deadly weapon,
rape, and carrying a pistol without a license. He was then committed
to a mental hospital and thereafter brought an equal protection
challenge claiming that for purposes of commitment, the NGRI acquittee should be governed by the same standard of proof as those civilly
committed. The court struck down this challenge and justified the procedural differences in treatment based upon the fact that those persons
found NGRI have committed acts which impaired the public's
safety,' whereas those civilly committed had not posed any harm to
society and should be afforded greater protection before depriving
them of their liberty.'19
Other courts, however, have expressed a contrary view and hold
that procedural differences between the NGRI acquittee and the civil
committee are violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The case of State v. Krol'" supports the contention that
NGRI acquittees are subject to the same procedural protections as
those civilly committed. In Krol, the defendant had been indicted for
murder but was found NGRI by a jury verdict. Acting pursuant to
New Jersey law,2"' he was committed to the Forensic Psychiatric
196. Id.
197. The court in Brown stated:
Persons acquitted by reason of insanity have been determined to have been guilty,
beyond a reasonable doubt of acts that impaired the safety of the community.
They are in a different position, at least for some purposes, from persons who
have not committed any such acts but are sought to be civilly committed soley
because of dangers and propensities arising from mental condition.
Id. at 610.
198. Another justification offered by the court for treating the NGRI patient differently was expressed by Judge Leventhal as follows:
The difference between the classes for purposes of burden of proof, is in the extent of possibility and consequence of error. If there is error in determination of
mental illness that results in a civil commitment, a person may be deprived of
liberty although he never posed any harm to society. If there is a similar error in
confinement of an insanity-acquitted individual, there is not only the fact of harm
already done, but the substantial prospect that the same error, ascribing the quality of mental disease to a less extreme deviance, resulted in a legal exculpation
where there should have been legal responsibility for the antisocial action.
Id. at 611.
199. 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975).
200. The court explained the law thusly:
The governing statute, N.J.S.A. 2A; 163-3, provides that if the jury finds the
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, it must then make a special finding as
to whether defendant's 'insanity continues'; if it finds that defendant's 'insanity'
does 'continue,' defendant is ordered confined to the Trenton Psychiatric
Hospital 'until such time as he may be restored to reason.' This confinement is for
an indefinite period of time, and may prove permanent, for 'restoration to reason'
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Hospital in Trenton. Krol appealed his commitment arguing that the
State must first determine whether he presently poses a significant
threat of harm either to himself or to others. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that this statute assumed that NGRI acquittees, as a
class, are more likely to be dangerous than other persons, which is
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In its finding the court expressed the opinion-that confinement of an
individual based upon dangerousness should be determined on a case
by case basis and not on the basis of NGRI or committee classifications. 20' The Krol court cited two United States Supreme Court decision, Baxstrom v. Herold2 " ' and Jackson v. Indiana"°3 in its opinion as
an example of the Supreme Court's attempt to enunciate a broad principle: "The fact that the person to be committed has previously engaged in criminal acts is not a constitutionally acceptable basis for imposing upon him a substantially different standard or procedure for involuntary commitment. The labels 'criminal commitment' and 'civil
commitment' are of no constitutional significance.""'
Equal treatment for all persons in commitment proceedings was
also ordered by the United States Supreme Court in Baxstrom v.
Herold.z°" Baxstrom, while a prisoner, began having mental problems
and was certified as insane by a prison physician. He was subsequently
transferred to a state hospital used for prisoners declared mentally ill
while serving sentence. Pursuant to New York law, 0 6 Baxstrom was
civilly committed at the expiration of his prison sentence without a
jury review available to all others civilly committed. The Supreme
Court held that prisoners who had developed mental illness while incarcerated, and who were, as a result, being involuntarily committed to
a mental hospital, were entitled to substantially the same procedural
protections as all others subject to involuntary commitment. The court
requires not merely remission of acute symptoms but complete cure of the
underlying illness or personality disorder.... A lesser degree of improvement suffices to obtain for defendant only a 'conditional release' subject to summary
revocation by the court.
Id. at 243, 344 A.2d at 293.
201. The Krol Court stated: "The decisive consideration where personal liberty is
involved is that each individual's fate must be adjudged on the facts of his own case,
not on the general characteristics of a 'class' to which he may be assigned." Id. at 255,

344 A.2d at 299.
202. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
203. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
204. 68 N.J. at 250, 344 A.2d at 297.
205. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
206. The statute involved in Baxstrom was § 384 of the New York Correction Law.
That section was repealed in 1966 and its subject matter is now covered by N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 404 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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held the New York statute unconstitutional as it did not afford Baxstrom his right to jury review and thus denied him equal protection of
the law. The court rejected the argument that because of prior criminal
conduct the patient may undergo arbitrary differences in procedures
from those civilly committed.27
Even though the Baxstrom case did not deal with the standard for
release, its rationale was later applied by the Court in a case involving
the release of an individual. In Jackson v. Indiana,"' the court addressed an issue involving a mentally defective deaf mute who was
found incompetent to stand trial and evidenced little likelihood of improvement in his condition. The trial court had found that Jackson
lacked comprehension sufficient to make his defense and he was
therefore ordered committed until such time as he was competent to
stand trial. This order in effect would have civilly committed Jackson
indefinitely. On review, the Supreme Court held that this procedure
deprived petitioner of equal protection because a more lenient commitment standard and a more stringent standard for release were used for
Jackson as opposed to the ordinary commitment proceedings applicable to all persons not charged with offenses." 9
The differing judicial perspectives on civil commitment standards
raise the question whether past evidence of violent behavior justifies
separate classification of the NGRI acquittee, stigmatizing him with
heightened procedures for release and adversarial procedures during
commitment."' To date the courts have been of little help in answering
this question as they provide no clear guidelines concerning what constitutes a proper governmental objective. They likewise have failed to
indicate what level of judicial review should be used to judge whether a
classification based on NGRI status violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.2I
207. The United States Supreme Court stated that classification of persons as
either insane or dangerously insane may be relevant in determining the type of
custodial or medical care necessary, but it has no relevance whatever in determining

whether a person is mentally ill and in need of institutionalization. 383 U.S. at 111.
208. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
209. Id. at 730.

210. At least one commentator has said:

The fundamental defect of Ecker II,in relying on a class distinction to justify differing methods of dealing with NGRI's and Committees, is that the fact that a NGRI
may have been recently found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed an offensive act is in no way pertinent in deciding what procedures he should be afforded
at a hearing on the validity of his initial or continued confinement ....
Comment, Constitutional Standards for Release of the Civilly Committed and Not

Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARiZ. L. REV. 233, 276

(1978).
211.

State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975). The New Jersey Supreme

Court stated:
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Equal Protection Analysis-The Blumstein Test

By mandating these procedural distinctions between NGRI acquittees and civil committees, S.B. 297 seems to lend itself to attack under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 212 The United
States Supreme Court, in Dunn v. Blumstein,213 enunciated the elements
to be considered in addressing an equal protection challenge. In deciding
whether a law violates the equal protection clause three factors must be

considered: 1) the character of the classification in question; 2) the individual interests affected by the classification; and 3) the governmental
interests asserted in support of the classification." '

(a) The Character of the Classification
In regard to the first element of the Blumstein test, the character of
the classification in question, S.B. 297 in effect places the NGRI acquittee into a separate class from those civilly committed patients.2" 5
For purposes of committment and release under the new law, the
NGRI acquittee is ordered to follow different procedural requirements

which make the release or conditional release more difficult to obtain
for the NGRI class. One of the major procedural changes S.B. 297
mandates is the move of the commitment and release hearings from
the probate court to the trial court.21 6 In so doing, the NGRI acquittee
must not only prove to the hospital that he is ready for release but

must also prove this fact to the trial judge who found the acquittee not
The Supreme Court, in deciding Jackson v. Indianaand Baxstrom v. Herold, has
clearly not indicated whether differences in commitment procedure between those
applicable to persons acquitted by reason of insanity and those applicable to other
persons subject to civil commitment must be justified by a 'compelling state interest' or whether some lesser interest will suffice. State courts considering the
question have divided.
Id. at 253, 344 A.2d at 298.
212. See note 184 supra.
213. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Blumstein, the Court addressed a Tennessee law
which required a one year residency requirement in the state and three months in the
county as a prerequisite to vote. The Court, employing a strict scrutiny standard of
review, held that the law unconstitutionally abridged the fundamental interests of the
right to Vote and to travel.
214. Id. at 335.
215. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980). This section orders
the trial court, which found him NGRI, to conduct the commitment and release hearings. All others civilly committed are referred to the probate court. The NGRI acquitees' hearings are open to the public with the prosecutor able to act in an adversarial
role representing the public's interest. See note 39, notes 50-59 and accompanying text
supra.
216. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Page Supp. 1980).
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guilty by reason of insanity.2" The hearing for involuntary commit-

ment subsequent to a finding of NGRI is now also held in the trial
court. The effect of these changes is to allow the criminal courts to retain some control over the NGRI acquittee even though the NGRI patient has been absolved of past actions.2" 8 This move from the probate

court to the trial court has been viewed by some interested parties to
the bill as having a negative effect on the NGRI acquittee's chances for
release.

29

Although the state, via its police power, can make laws for the protection of the public,2 2 the question is whether the interests underlying
this power justifies a separate classification of the NGRI patient. As
was previously discussed, court interpretations vary whether the NGRI
217. Although the trial judge will not necessarily always be the trier of fact, he is in
most of the cases in which the NGRI defense is made. See note 134 and accompanying
text supra.
218. One commentator has stated: "Other jurisdictions are re-thinking the theory
[that confinement of the NGRI patient, the convict, and the civil committee occupy
different places on the continuum of state interests] accepted by Ecker II, apparently
on the assumption that the criminal law should have no influence on release decisions
involving defendants who have been found not guilty." Comment, Constitutional
Standardsfor Release of the Civilly Committed and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity:
A Strict Scrutiny Analaysis, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 233, 250 (1978). The author cited the
following cases in support of his statement: State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, 83, 515
P.2d 324, 328 (1973); Wilson v. State, 259 Ind. 375; 386, 287 N.E.2d 875, 881 (1972);
People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 533-35, 221 N.W.2d 569, 579-80 (1974); People
v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 35, 224 N.E.2d 87, 92, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 660 (1966); State ex
rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612, 622, 219 N.W.2d 341, 346-47 (1972). See note
203 supra. The NGRI acquittee at the trial court level is faced with a "quasi-criminal"
proceeding, open to the public, in which the prosecutor acts in an adversarial role
representing the public's interest. Interview with Attorney, Robert Goelz, Montgomery
County, Assistant Prosecutor (Oct. 16, 1980) (on file with the University of Dayton
Law Review office).
219. Resnick Interview, supra note 134. Dr. Resnick commented that one of the
weak points in the Bill is having the trial judge retain control of release of insanity acquittees. He expressed concern that the trial judge, as an elected official would be subject to political pressure from the public to be more conservative in releasing individuals, albeit the trial judge is sworn to uphold the law fairly and without partiality.
Dr. Resnick also stated he felt the trial judge would have less experience addressing
issues of civil commitability than do probate judges. See generally notes 129-133 and
accompanying text supra.
John Gulden, Legal Counsel for Ohio Retarded Citizens, expressed basically the
same concerns. He believes that the probate courts have much more expertise regarding release hearings because they deal with guardianship procedures, civil commitments, etc. on a daily basis. He also believes there would be pressure from the
public on the trial judge to keep the NGRI patients off the street. Interview with John
Gulden, Legal Counsel for Ohio Retarded Citizens (Sept. 25, 1980) thereinafter cited
as Gulden Interview] (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review office).
220. See note 183 and accompanying text supra.
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acquittees, as a class, can be ordered to undergo different procedural
requirements because of their past criminal actions. There is empirical
data which suggests the conclusion that special dangerousness of a
class is an erroneous assumption.
The best known studies disputing the existence of any special
dangerousness of a class of patients although not dealing with
NGRI's are followups of "Operation Baxstrom," under which 969
prisoner-patients in maximum security hospitals in New York state
were transferred to civil hospitals as the result of a court decision.
Psychiatrists had determined that these patients were too
dangerous to be in civil hospitals. Nevertheless, one year after
transfer, 147 had been discharged to the community, and of the
other 702, only seven had been returned to maximum security conditions. Thus, less than one percent of those initially considered
too dangerous for civil hospitalization proved to be so. In 1970,
three years later, 27 percent were living in the community, only
nine persons had been convicted of crime (including two felonies),
and only three percent had been returned to a facility for the
criminally insane. 22'
Considering the foregoing case law and empirical data, a strong
argument can be made that the separate classification of the NGRI patient may be violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
(b)

Individual Interests Affected

The second element of the Blumstein test involves looking at the
individual interests affected by the classification. Senate Bill 297 impinges upon the NGRI acquittee's basic right to liberty or to be free
from confinement as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.2 22
When analyzing whether a law is violative of the equal protection
clause, the level of judicial scrutiny necessary to justify this deprivation
of liberty must be considered. " Depending upon the court's inter221. German & Singer, supra note 138, at 1024 (citing Hunt & Wiley, Operation
Baxytrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 974 (1968)); Steadman & Keveles,
The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-70,
129 AM. J. PSYCHiAT. 309 (1972). Mr. Robert Baylor at the state hospital for the

criminally insane in Lima, Ohio stated he does not see any significant behavioral differences between the NGRI patient and those committed for other reasons. Interview
with Robert Baylor, Assistant Director, Lima State Hospital (Sept. 25, 1980) (on fe
with the University of Dayton Law Review office).
222. See notes 168-175 and accompanying text supra.
223. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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pretation, the state may be held to the strict scrutiny standard or the
22 4 At this time the courts are divided
less stringent rational basis test.
as to which standard is appropriate in justifying involuntary commithas not explicitly
ment of a person. The United States Supreme Court
2 2' implied that the raaddressed the issue but in Baxstrom v. Herold
intional basis test could be used to justify the classification of civilly
suffibe
interest would
sane or criminally insane and a legitimate state
22
challenge.
cient to overcome a constitutional
Other jurisdictions would hold that since S.B. 297 impinges on the
basic right of liberty protected by the Constitution, it would follow
if
that the standard of strict scrutiny would be applicable to determine
2 '
Under
the state's interest is sufficient to warrant the classification.
the strict scrutiny test, the state must show a compelling state interest
in its distinction between classes similarly situated and must use the
least restrictive alternative for effectuating its objectives."'
of
Although the individual interests affected by the classification
acquitthe
to
the NGRI acquittee, as mandated by S.B. 297, pertains
tee's basic right to liberty, it is difficult to comment on the bill's equal
protection validity as the courts are not in agreement on which standard of judicial scrutiny to use.
(c) Governmental Interests Asserted
The final factor under Blumstein, the governmental interests
asserted in support of the classification, must be considered to detera
mine if the state's purpose for the classification possesses either
a
legitimate state interest to comply with the rationale basis test or
The
applied.
is
test
scrutiny
strict
compelling state interest if the
to
legislative history of S.B. 297 indicates that the purpose of the bill is
patient
NGRI
the
protect the welfare and safety of the public as well as
himself. 29 The Ohio General Assembly was of the opinion that the
- 224.

LAW at
See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL

522 (1978).
225.

383 U.S. 107 (1966).

227.

The court
People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).

226. The United States Supreme Court in Baxstrom stated: "Equal protection does
distincnot require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a
made."
tion made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is
Id. at I11.
stated: "We acknowledge the premise of the amicus equal protection position that
have a
since a 'fundamental interest' (defendant's liberty) is involved, the State must
'compelling state interest' to justify the differences in treatment." Id. at 533 n.4, 221
N.W.2d at 579 n.4.
1, 16 (1973).
228. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

229.

Bontempo Interview, supra note 128.
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prior law, which allowed the NGRI patient to voluntarily sign himself
out of the hospital, was a weakness in the law which needed rectification. 3 ' The legislature also felt the public's interest should be
represented in the release of the NGRI patient. 2 3 '
While some argue that protecting the public is a compelling state
interest sufficient to pass the strict scrutiny test, some courts have
found that classification for procedural purposes between the NGRI
acquittees and civil committees does not even pass the rational basis
test as a legitimate state interest. The court in State v. Kro 232 stated
that a decision was not necessary on whether the classification of the
NGRI acquittee and civil committee was based on a compelling state
interest as "[t he distinction between the standard for involuntary
commitment for persons acquitted by reason of insanity and other persons lacks even a rational basis." 2'33 In People v. McQuillan,"" the
court held an automatic commitment procedure unconstitutional in
that it failed to provide substantially equal treatment in terms of commitment and release procedures for those committed as NGRI and
those civilly committed. The court stated that "as we believe the 'rational basis' test is not met here, discussion of 'compelling state interest' is unnecessary."235
Assuming that the state's interest in providing for the welfare and
safety of its citizens is a compelling state interest, yet another question
to be answered is whether classifying the NGRI acquittee is the least
restrictive alternative possible to protect that interest.2 36 It is possible
to argue that if the state is interested in protecting its citizens from the
NGRI patient voluntarily signing himself out of a mental institution
without a hearing, a change from the probate court to the trial court is
not necessary. The situation could be corrected by a measure which
simply prohibits voluntary release by the NGRI patient.2 37 Although
"[d]oubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the public, . . . the
court should not, by its order, infringe upon defendant's liberty or
autonomy any more than appears reasonably necessary to accomplish
230. Id.
231. Id.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975).
Id. at 253, 344 A.2d at 298.
392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
Id. at 533 n.4, 221 N.W.2d at 579 n.4.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).

237. Attorney John Gulden, counsel for Ohio Retarded Citizens, commented that
the loophole in the law regarding the NGRI patient signing himself out could have
been remedied by simply including a provision which prohibits voluntary release.
Gulden Interview, supra note 219.
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this goal." 2'38 Therefore, one can also question whether moving the
NGRI's hearings to the trial court, which allows the public and press
to be present,239 is necessary for the public's interest to be represented.
Seemingly this interest would be sufficiently protected by moving the
commitment and release hearings from the probate division of the
Allen County Common Pleas Court2' " to the probate court of the
county in which the trial took place. 2 4 ' The interests of the people
within that particular community could be safeguarded by the judge
without the prejudice to the NGRI patient that is inherent in the current procedures.242
It seems clear that S.B. 297 contains many issues, constitutional
and otherwise, that will need to be resolved. Senator Richard H.
Finan, in his comments about S.B. 297, stated: "[tihe possible effect
on the public is probably an issue wherein the jury is still out." 2 '3
V.

CONCLUSION

S.B. 297's inception emerged from two paramount concerns expressed by the Ohio General Assembly. The first involved public safety
which was felt to be significantly endangered under prior Ohio provisions for NGRI commitment. The second concern was for more adequate treatment and procedural protections for the.NGRI patient involved. Concentration of legislative efforts seems to have been placed
on the former.
Through numerous procedural changes, coupled with significant
jurisdictional revision and the closing of the existing loopholes in the
voluntary commitment area, the public safety concern seems to have
been squarely and adequately confronted by the legislature. Retention
in the civil commitment and conditional release hearings, by the same
trial judge who made the initial NGRI finding, and the inclusion of the
prosecutor as a party to these hearings, are developments designed to
fashion a procedure which provides greater accountability to the
public. The effect of these changes will most likely culminate in a
greater awareness and sensitivity to any seemingly potential dangers
resulting from release, either outright or conditional, of a person
found NGRI.
Concomitant with the aforementioned changes, the legislature,
238.
239.

240.
241.
242.
243.

State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 261-62, 344 A.2d 289, 303 (1975).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.40, 5122.15 (Page Supp. 1980).
See note 8 supra.
See note 149 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 131-149 and 160-165 and accompanying text supra.
Finan Letter, supra note 126.
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through the addition of a provision for conditional release, sought to
provide more adequate treatment for those committed following an
NGRI verdict. Though seemingly significant facially, the provision is
unfortunately lacking in two respects; most notably, from openendedness in the setting of conditions and from statutory conflict between
the provision itself and the actual commitment standards. Although
actual application will be solely determinative of the effectiveness of
this provision, these flaws take much of the bite out of its intended
purpose.
Finally, although the bill may raise equal protection concerns
regarding the classification of NGRI patients as opposed to other civil
committees, S.B. 297 stands at least as a positive clarification of the
existing law, providing a clear set of specific procedures to be followed.
Whether this stability and clarity coupled with the public safety factor
is sufficient to counterbalance the lack of procedural safeguards provided the NGRI patient, is a viable question yet to be resolved.
Frank Nagatani
Ned J. Nakles
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